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STATE OF TENNESSEE V. KEVIN E. TRENT* 
BEN RAYBIN AND JULIANA LAMAR 
On May 3, 2012, Kevin E. Trent was under the influence of 
prescription medication when he drove his pick-up truck across three lanes 
of traffic, and collided head-on with a vehicle driven by Karen Freeman. As 
a result of the accident, Ms. Freeman suffered multiples injuries making her 
unable to speak or walk. Ms. Freeman was hospitalized for a period of two 
months before being transferred to a nursing home. Ms. Freeman succumbed 
to her injuries in October 2013. 
Trent plead guilty to one count of vehicular homicide as result of his 
intoxication, a Class B felony. He was sentenced to eight years following a 
plea agreement, with his manner of service to be determined by the trial court 
following a sentencing hearing. 
During the hearing, evidence showed that Trent’s blood at the time 
of the accident was above therapeutic levels for prescription medication. 
Trent was prescribed Oxycodone and Xanax after he lost both of his arms 
below the elbow and his left leg following a 2005 motorcycle accident. 
Though Trent was also prescribed prosthetic devices for these injuries, he 
admitted that he did not use them while driving, nor did he make any 
modifications to his truck to accompany his physical limitations. Trent 
testified to being unaware of warning labels on his prescriptions cautioning 
him not to drive while taking the medications.1 Trent also admitted to taking 
more pills than his prescription allotted for whenever his pain was 
particularly bad, but did not think his medications impaired his driving. 
When Trent was questioned about the accident, he stated he had no memory 
of the event or the three weeks preceding it. 
The trial court sentenced Trent to eight years confinement, denying 
probation to avoid “depreciating the seriousness of the offense.”2 Trent 
appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals arguing the proof did not support 
the trial court’s decision denying probation “because the circumstances of his 
offense were not ‘especially violent, horrifying, shocking, reprehensible, 
offensive, or otherwise of an excessive or exaggerated degree.’” The Court 
of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling and sentenced Trent to 
probation. 
                                                 
 *  State v. Trent, 533 S.W.3d 282 (Tenn. 2017). 
 1. Trent acknowledged that the labels on his prescriptions warned him that the 
medications may cause drowsiness, but stated the labels did not tell him he could not drive. 
 2.  Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(1)(B).  
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On appeal, the Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed the judgment 
of the Court of Criminal Appeals, vacated the trial court’s sentencing 
determination, and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing. The 
Court began by stating the standard of review, which provides that sentencing 
determinations should be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, 
with a presumption of reasonableness for within-range sentencing decisions 
that reflect a proper application of law.3 But the Bise Court also noted that 
“appellate courts cannot properly review a sentence if the trial court fails to 
articulate in the record its reasons for imposing the sentence.”4  
Looking at the case at hand, the court found that the trial court did 
not sufficiently articulate its reasons for imposing the sentence. Moreover, 
the court held that the trial court appeared to have improperly reached its 
decision denying probation. In State v. Travis, the court explained that, when 
the seriousness of a defendant’s crime is the sole reason for ordering 
incarceration, the circumstances of the particular crime as committed by the 
defendant must be considered.5  
Because some crimes are statutorily ineligible for probation under 
any circumstances, the legislature is presumed to have deemed the other 
crimes inherently eligible for probation absent some additional factor. The 
commission of the essential elements of a probation-eligible offense—no 
matter how serious the offense or the essential elements may be—cannot 
alone justify denial of probation. Rather, the sentencing court must find that 
the offense was committed in a particularly egregious manner in order to 
deny probation. 
In Trent, the court explained that “the trial court made no findings 
regarding the particular circumstances surrounding the Defendant’s 
commission of [the offense].”6 Rather, it held that “it appears” the trial court 
abused its discretion by denying probation “simply upon the elements of the 
offense” rather than additional factors. The court thus vacated the denial of 
probation as improperly ordered.7 
The Supreme Court of Tennessee next reached the issue of remedy. 
The intermediate decision by the Court of Criminal Appeals independently 
reviewed the record and ordered a sentence of probation. The court reversed 
this determination as well. Just as the record was insufficient to uphold a 
sentence denying probation, the court held the record was also insufficient to 
allow an appellate court to grant probation. The court identified certain facts 
in the record which could potentially justify a denial of probation if more 
fully examined, and remanded for a new sentencing hearing to more 
thoroughly examine the entirety of the case. 
                                                 
 3.  State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682 (Tenn. 2012).  
 4.  Id. at 705; See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(e) (requiring the sentencing court to 
“place on the record . . . the reasons for the sentence”). 
 5.  State v. Travis, 622 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn. 1981). 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
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The central holding vacating the sentence in this case did not 
establish a new doctrine of law but merely reiterated the holding in Travis 
that the essential elements of the offense alone cannot justify denial of 
probation in a probation-eligible offense. The Trent decision should be 
viewed by trial judges and practitioners primarily as a reminder of that 
principal. 
On the other hand, the court broke some new ground in appellate 
review. Prior decisions established that appellate courts can only uphold a 
sentence if the record is sufficient record to allow “meaningful appellate 
review.” Trent took that rule a step further by requiring a sufficient record 
for an appellate court to affirmatively impose a sentence. 
